Nagaland Government’s FNTA Proposal: A Superficial Attempt Lacking Three Genuine Autonomy for Eastern Nagaland

The October 30, 2024, announcement by the Nagaland government regarding the establishment of the Frontier Nagaland Territorial Authority (FNTA) has stirred deep concerns among Eastern Nagaland’s communities and the Eastern Nagaland People’s Organisation (ENPO). Despite claims by Ministers KG Kenye and CL John that the FNTA proposal marks progress, the lack of legislative, executive and financial autonomy and limited administrative authority within the proposal fall short of the ENPO’s vision for true self-governance. This move, rather than representing a meaningful step toward addressing the region’s aspirations, seems like another superficial concession that fails to address the core needs of Eastern Nagaland’s people.

The ENPO has persistently demanded an arrangement that would allow Eastern Nagaland full control over its resources and administrative functions to rectify decades of neglect.

However, the FNTA proposal, which will function without any amendment to Article 371 (A) or legislative , executive and financial independence, restricts FNTA’s capacity to allocate resources according to the specific needs of the region. By placing FNTA’s budget under the control of the state government, Eastern Nagaland’s economic and social priorities remain subordinated to state-level decisions—a continuation of the same dependency that has long stifled the region’s growth.

Minister Kenye’s assertion that FNTA would rely on state-administered funds fundamentally undermines the concept of self-governance. ENPO’s call for autonomy is premised on the need for legislative, executive and financial control, allowing the region to allocate resources swiftly and according to urgent local priorities. By remaining bound to state-controlled budgets and powers, FNTA is left reliant on a bureaucratic process that historically has failed to meet Eastern Nagaland’s unique needs. Legislative, Executive and Financial Autonomy are not merely a preference but a necessity for FNTA to prioritise regional projects and respond to socio-economic challenges without delays or interference from higher authorities.

In its proposed form, FNTA’s administrative limitations compound these issues. The creation of a “mini-secretariat” is framed as a step toward decentralisation, but FNTA’s authority will be confined primarily to rural and community-level projects, while major infrastructure responsibilities will continue to be managed by the Nagaland Public Works Department (NPWD). This fragmented structure fails to address ENPO’s demand for a fully-fledged governance system that can independently administer key services such as health, education, and public works. Such an arrangement effectively limits FNTA’s role to

low-impact administrative functions, reducing it to an extension of Kohima rather than a true governing authority capable of fostering meaningful development in Eastern Nagaland.

Moreover, the absence of any mechanisms for accountability and transparency in the proposal further undercuts FNTA’s credibility as a governance institution. The lack of direct control over its financial resources raises serious concerns about its ability to ensure that funds are effectively managed and equitably distributed. Minister Kenye’s comment on the inability to guarantee “timelines” in fund allocations reveals a lack of commitment to a transparent and reliable budgeting process. Effective governance requires FNTA to have a clear, accountable system for financial management. Without accountability, FNTA risks becoming a hollow bureaucratic shell, incapable of delivering tangible benefits to Eastern Nagaland’s communities.

The FNTA proposal also deprives the region of the flexibility needed to address its distinct socio-economic and cultural needs. Minister John’s statement that FNTA would operate strictly under central guidelines, without the freedom to establish localised policies, dismisses the ENPO’s request for adaptive governance. Eastern Nagaland’s communities face unique social and economic challenges that require policies specifically tailored to their context. The inability to create region-specific regulations within FNTA restricts its potential to effectively address these challenges, essentially blocking the region from setting its own development agenda. For FNTA to fulfil its role as an autonomous entity, it must have the authority to enact policies that are responsive to Eastern Nagaland’s realities rather than adhering rigidly to a one-size-fits-all framework.

In this form, FNTA’s limitations render it little more than an administrative formality incapable of enacting substantial change in Eastern Nagaland. This superficial proposal not only fails to empower the region but also threatens to deepen frustrations among a community that has long sought meaningful autonomy. Instead of addressing the root causes of

socio-economic inequality and developmental neglect, FNTA, as proposed, risks reinforcing the very conditions that have driven Eastern Nagaland’s demand for genuine self-governance.

To create a governance structure that truly responds to Eastern Nagaland’s needs, the Nagaland government must undertake substantial revisions to the FNTA proposal.

Legislative, Executive and Financial autonomy are the bedrock of meaningful

self-governance, and FNTA must have independent control over its resources to set priorities that align with local needs. Without this authority, FNTA will remain reliant on state funds and unable to take action on critical regional issues. Additionally, FNTA’s council must be granted control over essential departments, including healthcare, education, and infrastructure, to ensure that decisions are made by those who understand the unique needs of Eastern Nagaland.

Accountability and transparency are equally crucial. FNTA must be structured to provide open access to budgetary information, establish clear processes for financial oversight, and publicly report on expenditures to build trust with the communities it serves. The implementation of robust accountability mechanisms will be vital to ensuring FNTA’s resources are utilised effectively and equitably. Equally important is FNTA’s policy-making flexibility; it should be empowered to develop localised policies that reflect Eastern Nagaland’s socio-economic landscape and cultural context.

In conclusion, the current FNTA proposal does not fulfil the aspirations of Eastern Nagaland’s people. By limiting its scope, maintaining financial dependence, and restricting its policy-making powers, FNTA as proposed falls far short of ENPO’s vision for genuine autonomy and equitable governance. If the Nagaland government is committed to addressing Eastern Nagaland’s demands for self-governance, it must go beyond symbolic concessions and create an FNTA that is financially independent, administratively empowered, and responsive to local needs. Only through substantive reforms can FNTA

 transform into a legitimate institution of self-governance, answering Eastern Nagaland’s

long-standing call for autonomy and marking a step toward a more equitable and prosperous future for the region.

Author’s Note:

As a son of Eastern Nagaland, I am compelled to express my unwavering commitment to our people’s rightful aspirations. Our journey transcends mere symbolic gestures; it demands genuine empowerment that acknowledges the distinct challenges and deplorable living conditions we endure, exacerbated by the shortcomings of the Nagaland state government and the far-flung geopolitical landscape we navigate.

This article serves as a clarion call for the government to recognise our demands as crucial steps toward justice, meaningful development, and authentic progress in Eastern Nagaland. May these words echo our resilience and resolve as we stand united in our pursuit of a brighter future.

Noktan Konyak Naga