The phrase "from Naga Hoho to Naga Haha" is obviously rhetorical, but it captures a serious political tragedy, as Naga Hoho has become an object of ridicule.
The history of the Naga Hoho is important because it represents one of the most ambitious attempts in the post-1990 period to create a civil-society institution that transcends tribal, territorial, and factional divisions. Its story is also a cautionary one: an institution created to unite the Naga people can itself be weakened when the very divisions it was designed to overcome enter its own structure.
Naga Hoho: the original idea
The Naga Hoho formally emerged from a process that began in 1994. A meeting was held at the Naga Students' Federation office in Kohima on 25 June 1994, followed by the Naga Summit at Wokha on 15 November in the same year. The decisive work was carried out by a Joint Liaison Committee, formed in 1996, which brought together Naga tribal organisations from Nagaland and Manipur. The Naga Hoho's constitution was adopted at Zunheboto on 11–12 March 1998.
Its conception was therefore broader than the creation of another tribal organisation. The ambition was to construct a Pan-Naga civil institution that could speak for Nagas irrespective of the state in which they lived.
Its principal objectives included:
• creating a sense of oneness among the Nagas;
• defending Naga political, economic and socio-cultural rights;
• protecting traditional Naga territories and their people;
• working toward integration of Naga-inhabited areas;
• promoting the welfare and development of the Naga people;
• safeguarding Naga customary institutions and traditions;
• facilitating an early and peaceful settlement of the Naga political problem.
The underlying philosophy was captured in the idea "Nagas are One." That was an extraordinarily important proposition in the 1990s because the Naga political movement had already fragmented into competing organisations, even as tribal consciousness remained extremely powerful.
The architects
It would be misleading to attribute the creation of the Naga Hoho to a single individual or a small group. It was the product of many tribal hohos, civil-society leaders, and senior Naga public figures.
But two names stand out from its formative period: M. Vero and Niketu Iralu.
M. Vero — the first President
Melhupra (M.) Vero brought to the new organisation what it desperately needed: political experience, personal credibility, and access to different sections of Naga society.
He had already served two terms in the Rajya Sabha and had been a member of the Nagaland Legislative Assembly. He was also among the early Naga political leaders who engaged with New Delhi on issues affecting Naga identity and rights. He became the first President of the Naga Hoho and held that position until 2004.
Vero's importance was not merely institutional. His personality suited the difficult circumstances of the 1990s.
Niketu Iralu later described Vero as a man whose greatest longing was the restoration of the Naga family and said that the trust and goodwill generated under his leadership made people believe again in the proposition that Nagas are One. That may be the best description of Vero's contribution.
He was not trying to become another Naga nationalist supreme leader. His strength lay precisely in his ability to stand between competing political and tribal interests. He also participated in peace initiatives, including efforts related to the Naga ceasefire and dialogue. In 2001, for example, he led the Naga goodwill delegation to Assam alongside Niketu Iralu at a particularly tense moment in Naga-Assam relations. His understated leadership proved an asset.
Niketu Iralu — the moral and intellectual force
If Vero provided political legitimacy, Iralu provided much of the moral, intellectual, and reconciliation-oriented energy.
Iralu's background was unusual. He had spent decades working internationally with Moral Re-Armament, later known as Initiatives of Change, before returning to Northeast India. His experience exposed him to conflict-resolution methods that went beyond conventional nationalist politics.
His great contribution was his insistence that the Naga problem was not merely: Nagas versus India. It had also become: Nagas versus Nagas.
The killings, factionalism, tribal rivalry, and political distrust had damaged the social fabric of Naga society. That insight became central to his work.
After the 1997 ceasefire, Iralu worked with the Naga Hoho and civil society to encourage the underground groups to heed civil-society concerns.
In 2001, when the extension of the ceasefire to Naga-inhabited areas outside Nagaland triggered serious unrest, the Naga Hoho brought together tribal organisations, churches, and other civil-society groups. Iralu was selected to convene the reconciliation committee. Its mandate was twofold:
1. Reconcile the Nagas among themselves;
2. Reach out to neighbouring communities to rebuild relationships.
The Naga goodwill visit to Assam in September 2001, led by Vero and Iralu, was a remarkable example of this philosophy in action.
Iralu subsequently became closely associated with the Naga National Reconciliation Commission and the broader reconciliation movement. His death in August 2026 has brought renewed attention to this aspect of his legacy.
His greatest contribution was therefore not simply to the Naga Hoho as an organisation. It was the introduction of a different political ethic: peace without surrender, reconciliation without forgetting, and nationalism without hatred.
What did the Naga Hoho actually achieve?
The achievements of its early period should not be underestimated.
1. It created a Pan-Naga platform
For perhaps the first time in the post-conflict period, tribal organisations from different Naga-inhabited areas could meet under a single recognised institutional umbrella.
That was particularly significant because the Naga people are administratively divided among Nagaland, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, and Myanmar.
2. It helped preserve the idea of Naga unity
The Naga Hoho kept alive the proposition that geographical boundaries and administrative divisions should not erase the broader Naga identity.
3. It became a bridge between civil society and underground organisations
The Hoho had sufficient legitimacy to engage political groups that governments could not easily reach through ordinary political channels.
4. It participated in reconciliation
Its role after the 1997 ceasefire was particularly significant. The Hoho recognised that a political settlement would be impossible if Naga society remained divided.
5. It gave Nagas a collective civil-society voice
At different times, it intervened on questions concerning Naga rights, customary institutions, territorial issues, and the peace process.
Thus, the Naga Hoho was at its best when it served as a mediator rather than a ruler.
From "Naga Hoho" to "Naga Haha"
The phrase "from Naga Hoho to Naga Haha" is obviously rhetorical, but it captures a serious political tragedy.
The "Hoho" was supposed to evoke the traditional Naga institution of collective deliberation—a gathering in which differences could be discussed and consensus sought.
The "Haha" suggests that the institution has become, in the eyes of many Nagas, an object of disappointment, ridicule, or even political irrelevance.
Criticism intensified after several major Naga organizations withdrew from or distanced themselves from it. In 2024, the Working Committee of the Naga National Political Groups accused the Naga Hoho of losing credibility and aligning with a particular faction; reports also noted that the ENPO, NTC, and CNTC had withdrawn. These are political allegations from its critics, not neutral findings, but they reveal how seriously its legitimacy had deteriorated.
And there is an important development in 2026: at its July 31 Federal Assembly in Senapati, the Naga Hoho resolved to dissolve its current Executive Council and form a new one within three months. The stated objective was to renew the organisation and strengthen Naga unity.
So the institution has not necessarily disappeared. Rather, it is undergoing a crisis of legitimacy and attempted reconstruction.
Why did it fail?
I would qualify the word "failed." The Naga Hoho did not fail completely. Its first decade was arguably one of the more constructive periods of Naga civil-society engagement. But it failed to institutionalise its original vision sufficiently to survive the intensification of factional politics.
There were several reasons.
1. It could not remain above factional politics
This was likely the most damaging problem. An apex body has authority only if all parties believe: "This institution belongs to us equally."
Once one faction regards it as sympathetic to another, its moral authority collapses. The 2024 criticism that the Hoho had become an extension of a particular faction illustrates this problem precisely.
2. Tribalism proved stronger than institutional nationalism
The Naga Hoho was built on tribal hohos. That was both its strength and its weakness. The tribal hohos provided the organisational foundation, but they could also carry competing territorial, political, and economic interests into the apex organisation.
Thus: tribal unity created the Naga Hoho, but tribal competition could also weaken it.
3. It lacked independent institutional power
The Hoho had moral authority but lacked sovereign political authority. It could appeal, mediate, condemn, and persuade—but it could not compel competing political organisations to compromise.
That distinction grew increasingly important as the Naga political movement fragmented.
4. It became entangled with the Naga peace process
The more the Hoho became involved in the political settlement, the greater the risk that one group would accuse it of favouring another.
A civil-society institution attempting to mediate a conflict must maintain extraordinary neutrality. Once neutrality is in question, mediation becomes extremely difficult.
5. Generational change
The founders belonged to a generation shaped by the devastating experience of the Naga conflict and therefore understood the value of reconciliation differently.
Later generations inherited the institutions but not necessarily the same political culture. The moral capital accumulated by Vero and Iralu could not be automatically inherited by successors.
Who is responsible for the present state?
There is no intellectually honest answer that identifies a single person or organisation. Responsibility is collective, though not equal.
First responsibility: the Naga political factions
The greatest structural responsibility lies with the competing political organisations that allowed the Naga national movement to fragment and become factionalised. A people cannot easily form a unified political voice when several organisations claim exclusive legitimacy.
Second: tribal elites
Tribalism did not disappear with the founding of the Naga Hoho. At times, tribal organisations have protected legitimate community interests; at other times, tribal competition has taken precedence over the broader Naga interest.
The challenge is therefore not to abolish tribal identity but to prevent it from becoming tribal supremacy.
Third: successive Hoho leaderships
The Hoho itself must accept responsibility. An apex body cannot continually blame political factions, governments, and tribes for its decline.
It must ask: Why did people stop trusting us? Why did major Naga organisations withdraw? Why did we stop being perceived as neutral? Why did the institution fail to cultivate a new generation of trusted leaders?
These are uncomfortable questions, but they are necessary.
Fourth: Naga civil society as a whole
The responsibility also belongs to ordinary Naga society. Institutions weaken when people expect them to represent unity while they continue to reward factionalism, tribal patronage, and political loyalty.
The problem is therefore deeper than the Naga Hoho's. It concerns the political culture of Naga society.
The great irony
The tragedy of the Naga Hoho is that its original idea became more necessary just as the organisation itself was weakening.
Naga society today arguably needs an independent institution capable of bringing together:
• Nagaland Nagas;
• Nagas of Manipur;
• Nagas of Arunachal Pradesh and Assam;
• Nagas in Myanmar;
• tribal hohos;
• churches;
• women;
• youth;
• intellectuals;
• elected politicians;
• civil society;
• and the different Naga political groups.
But such an institution cannot be created merely by changing office-bearers. It requires a new social contract.
What should replace the old model?
The lesson from Vero and Iralu is especially important.
Vero represented trust. Iralu represented conscience. The next Naga apex institution needs both.
It should include at least five safeguards:
1. Complete political neutrality: No faction, party, or government should be allowed to capture it.
2. Genuine Pan-Naga representation: Representation must extend beyond Nagaland to include Naga communities across state and international boundaries.
3. Transparent leadership selection: Presidents and office-bearers should derive legitimacy from broad consultation rather than from elite arrangements.
4. A permanent reconciliation mechanism: Reconciliation should not be an emergency programme activated only when killings occur.
5. Accountability to the Naga people: Finances, decisions, representation, and political positions should be transparent.
The history of the Naga Hoho can be read as a miniature history of the Naga political condition. It began with a great idea: "Nagas are One." It achieved something remarkable: Nagas began to act together.
Then the old demons returned—tribalism, factionalism, political rivalry, mistrust, and competing claims to legitimacy. That is why the phrase "Naga Hoho to Naga Haha" is painful but meaningful.
But I would not write the final obituary of the Naga Hoho. The dissolution of its current Executive Council in July 2026 could instead be an opportunity for institutional rebirth, provided Nagas understand that changing personnel is not enough.
The real question is not: "Who should be the next President of the Naga Hoho?" It is: "What kind of institution can once again make a Tangkhul, Angami, Ao, Sumi, Lotha, Konyak, Chakhesang, Phom, Yimkhiung, Chang, Khiamniungan, Rengma, Sangtam, Zeliang, Poumai, Mao, Maram, Rongmei, or any other Naga feel that this is truly our institution?"
That was the genius behind the original vision. That is precisely what has been lost.
Vero understood the importance of trust. Iralu understood the necessity of reconciliation. The future Naga Hoho will survive only if it rediscovers both.
The greatest responsibility, therefore, does not belong to a single dead leader, a single living leader, a single faction, or a single tribe. It belongs to an entire political generation that inherited the dream of Naga unity yet repeatedly prioritized narrower interests over it. The task of the next generation is not merely to restore the Naga Hoho—it is to restore the credibility of the idea of Naga unity itself.
Besesayo Kezo
IPS, Retd, DGP