India must revamp its policy towards Pakistan

Kanwal Sibal [dropcap]S[/dropcap]everal aspects of our Pakistan policy need a fresh look by the new government in May, though how much change can be brought about remains an open question as the issues involved and the options available have been analysed over the years without producing an optimal policy for dealing with our neighbour. India’s Pakistan challenge is unique as it involves state-sponsored terrorism, religious extremism and nuclear arms. Pakistani territorial claims cannot be dealt with rationally as they are rooted in religion and the “idea” of Pakistan. Its Kashmir claim also sustains the dominant position of the strongly anti-Indian armed forces in the country’s polity. Rhetoric apart, Pakistan’s attitude towards India remains fundamentally unchanged over the years. Pakistan still harps on the Kashmir issue and its resolution on the basis of self-determination. While terrorism against India has declined because of developments on its western frontier, the infrastructure of terrorism remains in tact, both against us and Afghanistan.Water issues are now being raised to expand the area of conflict with us. The failure to accord MFN status despite promises indicates an inability to overcome deep seated political antipathies towards India. Opportunities: If the BJP’s prime ministerial candidate Narendra Modi comes to power there will be renewed opportunities to review India’s engagement with Pakistan The Pakistani narrative about India mirroring ours about Pakistan makes the bridging of differences exceedingly difficult. We are accused of being unreconciled to Pakistan’s creation and constantly conspiring to break it up. Accusations of ISI depredations against India are countered by allegations of RAW’s subversive activities in Pakistan, especially Balochistan. The Mumbai terrorist attack is equated with the Samjhauta Express, and the delay in trying those accused of perpetrating the former is bracketed with similar delay by us in investigating those involved in the latter. Kargil is justified as a reaction to our action in Siachen. Their nuclear tests were in response to ours. They deny MFN because we raise non-tariff barriers against Pakistani exports. The world has changed but Pakistan has not moved beyond 1947 and 1971 in its thinking about India, no matter what spin some Pakistanis give about wanting to live in peace with us, of Pakistan being less obsessed with India than vice-versa, about India not being an issue in Pakistani elections, of India failing to respond to “sincere” Pakistani overtures, of India no longer being enemy number one in popular perception etc. In reality, if our relations are blocked, it is because Pakistan believes that its readiness to talk is in itself a concession which must be reciprocated by acceptance of its demands. We must be willing to change the status quo in J&K and be open to UN or third party intervention if bilateralism fails; we should withdraw from Siachen and settle Sir Creek in accordance with Pakistan’s claims, not international principles; the issue of state-sponsored terrorism is no longer relevant as Pakistan itself is a victim of terrorism; we should cease squeezing the lemon of the Mumbai attacks to its last drop; we should not build power projects on Jhelum even though the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) allows it. Breakthrough Each new Indian prime minister nurtures, nevertheless, the hope of a breakthrough with Pakistan. Because Pakistan clings to its core positions, we have to be flexible for any dialogue to progress. Breakthrough Each new Indian prime minister nurtures, nevertheless, the hope of a breakthrough with Pakistan. Because Pakistan clings to its core positions, we have to be flexible for any dialogue to progress. Border patrol: While terrorism against India has declined because of developments on its western frontier, the infrastructure of terrorism in Pakistan remains in tact We pressure ourselves by believing that for us to rise as a nation, maintain our economic growth and secure foreign direct investment we must have a “successful” neighbourhood policy. We have no choice but to have a dialogue with Pakistan, we affirm, and in the process we have de-linked dialogue from terrorism and even accepted that Pakistan is as much a victim of terrorism as us. The challenges before the new government would be many. What must it do if a new Mumbai-scale attack is engineered by Pakistan-based terrorists against us? Will it respond with surgical strikes against POK targets? How will it deal with Nawaz Sharif’s renewed emphasis on Kashmir? Should it allow Pakistan to provocatively interfere in our internal affairs by meeting the Hurriyat leaders in Delhi? Should we in response establish public contact with Baluch leaders and announce “political and moral support” to them? Should we resume the dialogue with Pakistan as structured at present, despite its sterility? Should we pursue back-channel contacts with Pakistan? Assessment Should we make Siachen non-negotiable, given China’s Depsang valley incursion and its increasing presence in POK? How should we counter Pakistan’s anti-India campaign on the water issue despite being a bigger beneficiary of the IWT? Has the time come to review the presence of UNMOGIP in J&K as it represents the internationalisation of the Kashmir issue? Should cross-border trade and transport links be curtailed or expanded when cross-border terrorism remains a threat? Should we raise our voice more strongly against US military aid and China’s nuclear transfers to Pakistan? How much should we encourage people to people and sporting contacts with Pakistan and support liberal lobbies there? Should we not finesse Pakistan’s calculation that against offering MFN-like treatment to the new government they can seek the resumption of the dialogue? Should the new government not watch Pakistan’s conduct in Afghanistan post-Nato withdrawal and assess the implications of the religious radicalisation of Pakistani society as it forges a new approach towards our neighbour? One can argue against any hurry to engage Pakistan. Reaching out to it hastily to prove the new government’s moderate credentials will be construed as weakness. We need not look to strike a “statesmanlike” posture to disarm fears raised by the emergence of a reputedly more robust Indian leadership. Any calculation that the anti-Muslim image of a Modi-led government would be attenuated with a gesture towards Pakistan, with accompanying domestic returns, may be short-sighted. (The writer is a former Foreign Secretary)