The Ulterior Motive of NSCN-K and Myanmar Ceasefire Agreement

Paode A (EMN)

Today, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland/Nagalim – S.S. Khaplang (NSCN – K), formed in 30th April 1988, is having a cordial relationship with the Myanmar State military forces (Tatmadaws). In April 2012, the NSCN – K and the Myanmar government signed a bilateral “ceasefire agreement” at Khamti Township in Sagaing Region. The agreements were signed in the presence of top leaders Y.Wangtin Naga and six other members from the NSCN – K and Col. Kyi Naing, Minister for Security and Border Affairs, Sagaing Region, Governmen of Myanmar. Despite creating much ambiguity in the outlook of India’s Myanmar foreign policy and security interest, the agreements provide a novel platform of mutual understanding between the NSCN – K militants and the Tatmadaws. The other astounding result of the ceasefire agreement is the total absence of stiff military clashes between the two parties.

However, political dialogue between the NSCN – K and the Myanmar government seems to be tenuous or unprogressive. When the bilateral peace talk is measured in terms of the quantum of leap snowballing from the ongoing peace process, it is not treading in an orderly path. For example, the NSCN – K in 2015 refused to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) which is the necessity of all the ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) for taking part in the 21st Centrury Panglong Conference. The NSCN – K have not joined the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) which is the latest fusion of ethnic armed organisations recognised by the Governmet of Myanmar. Despite having bilateral ceasefire agreement with the Tatamadaw, the NSCN – K along with the Northern Alliance have been still sidelined from participating in the national peace conference by the Tatmadaw.

While, in the matter of fact that when both the NSCN – K and the Northern Alliance are still yet to take a decision of signing the NCA and join the upcoming national conference, the latter armed groups has been constantly fighting against the Tatmadaw whereas the former armed group is peacefully availing all the benefits of ceasefire agreement. Thus, this convivial aroma existing between the NSCN – K and the Tatmadaw culminating from the backdrops of ceasefire agreement permeates to perceive that are some “ulterior” motives existing between the two parties. But, before finding out what the ulterior motives are, two important questions require to be taken first. First, why did the NSCN-K refuse to sign the NCA in 2015 which is the prerequisite for participating in the 21st Century Panglong Conference? Second, why the Tatmadaw is giving free-hand (unrestricted freedom) to NSCN-K while on the one hand perpetrating counterinsurgency against the Northern Alliance? By means of trying to respond to these questions, the paper will attempt to highlight some points which may render perhaps the traits of “ulterior” motives in the ceasefire arrangement.

Benefits of Ceasefire Agreement
Despite strong and jittery reaction uttered from the government of India over the signing of ceasefire agreement, more contentious after the ambush of Indian soldiers in 2015, the Myanmar government has not satisfactorily quenched what India expected from the Tatmadaws. Moreover, as India continuing in invoking the Tatmadaws to staunchly fight against the NSCN – K, they continue to gleaning on several benefits provided by the ceasefire agreement without any obstacle in Myanmar soil. For instances, Tatmadaw, in coalesce with the term of cessation of arms conflict, allowed the NSCN-K to keep arms and to freely move unarmed cadres within Myanmar. They too set up designated military camps in the Naga Self-administered Zone, which includes Leshi, Lahe, and Nanyun townships in Sagaing Division. Besides these benefits, few other privileges were further included in 2013 such as the appointment of liaison offices at Khamti, local development projects and holding of sustained negotiations.

Thus, with all the benefits acquired from the impingement of ceasefire agreement, the NSCN – K managed to live co-existentially with the Tatmadaw. In the mean time, they built a good military rapports with other ethnic armed groups taking sanctuary in Myanmar and in the international borders.

In fact, it is too important to be taken into account the irresponsible attitude of the Myanmar government as one of the significant factors involved in leveraging the benefits of ceasefire agreement. Nevertheless, this lackadaisical attitude of the Myanmar governnment should not be exclusively framed with the often-stated vocabulary of lagging efficient intelligence and military-to-military supports. Rather, the “polarity” or the difference of Myanmar counterinsurgency policy leverages to the increment of benefits of ceasefire agreement reaping by the NSCN – K. The matter of fact is that, the Tatmadaw have cogently exposed of using unviable counterinsurgency policy against the Northern Alliance groups in the Kachin and northern Shan states, while in the Naga dominated region they in a watered -down approach just remained inoffensive and not even barely orchestrated stiff military action against the NSCN – K. Thus, the current unabated military clash in northern Myanmar explicates the polarity of Tatmadaws’ high-handedness military attentions toward the Northern Alliance groups.

The Ulterior Motives
Except the eight members of the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) who all singed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in 2015 took part in the first 21st Century Panglong Conference. And they have gauged the current National League for Democracy (NLD) government to follow the peace talk according to the legacy of the historic 1947 Panglong Agreement. Whereas, the Northern Alliance – Ta’ang Army, Arakan Army, United Wa State Army (UWSA), Kokang (MNDA-A), The National Democractic Army Alliance (NDA-A), Shan State Progressive Party – North (SSPP- N), and Kachin Independence Army (KIA), and the NSCN-K were not officially invited to participate in the peace conference. Although the Northern Alliance has the interest by signing the NCA and wanted to join the political dialogue. However, due to stiff political differences and antagonism with the Tatmadaw arose from not signing the ceasefire agreement and NCA, they haven’t participated in any organised national political dialogue and shared their goals of upgrading their self-administered zones to an ethnic state. In the event of the NSCN – K, dissimilarities are visible when compared with the Northern Alliance.

Some considered the beliefs that the Northern Alliance swayed away the NSCN – K from signing the NCA. This belief may be relevant only if both the parties have determined that the Tatmadaw would not consider their demand for separate federal state. Or, the NSCN – K might also have thought independently that they would be invited only as an observer and have no power in the decision-making body.

The more interesting and tenable reason for NSCN – K not signing the NCA may be due to it’s indecisive political goal which is something more imperative than sway away by it’s allies. According to the media reports the NSCN-K leaders and spokespersons have incomprehensively expressed that the reason for not signing NCA is due to disputes in their goals with the framework of political dialogue. Further, they have also illusively mentioned that they have not framed their goal which can be presented in the peace conference. In view of this regard, it is also not known what the government of Myanmar behind the scene have explained or reiterated. Till date there is no clear picture of what possibly lying between the NSCN -K and the government of Myanmar.

In addition, some scholars opined that the NSCN-K is anxiously negotiating for protection from the Myanmar government against attacks from “foreign country”, particularly India along the Indo-Myanmar border. Further, from the military tactical point of view, the ceasefire agreement helps NSCN-K to prevent from fighting two powerful enemies (India and Myanmar) at the same time. This military tactical point of view is also one trait of the “ulterior” motives of ceasefire agreement, but there is as well other significant elements of ‘defensive alliance’ present beyond this speculation. Another opinion says that the prospect of a ceasefire agreement would serve only the NSCN – K as a “bargaining chip” to deal with the government of India. This logic of “bargaining chip” to deal with the government of India may immediately be a nonacquiescing tool for the NSCN – K and vice versa. Because, recently India have declared NSCN-K as an outlaw militant. And to retrieve them for peace talk from the un-restricted territory in Myanmar is utmostly bleak. As such, not doubt there are obvious piftfalls in the ceasefire agreement. Yet, it is predictable that Myanmar government may extent the ceasefire agreement with NSCN – K purportedly as an approach to lessen down India’s security dilemma in the northeast regions. And in doing so, the government of Myanmar will contract and crease the political movement of the NSCN – K under the banner of national reconciliation.

To sum up, the chunks of “ceasefire benefits” and “polarity” of security interest” which helped in reinstating the politics of NSCN-K in Myanmar reinvigorates NSCN – K as an entity of stakeholder in Myanmar peace process. And the ‘ulterior’ design of giving a convivial atmosphere and ‘free-hand” to NSCN – K by the Tatmadaws is to make peace and to keep intact the Naga Self-Administered Zone from bifurcating into a new state while juggling with the idea of federal autonomy.

(Paode A is an independent research scholar. He completed his PhD degree from the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. )