Kekhrie Yhome
How does one appreciate and understand changes in the language of politics? Can we situate the Naga political imagination in the fold of such changes? And, make no mistake—even if you judge!
First thing first! The 03 August, 2015 Peace Accord between the Government of India and NSCN-IM is both historic and vibrant with political hope. Opinions will differ. But it is not everyday that such events are announced. Why should anyone oppose the Peace Accord—unless one is jealous or is destructively against peace for the land? There is also no reason why a cacophonic series of support should be publicly displayed—unless it is opportunism or sycophancy from bounty hunters.For, the Peace Accord is firstly a principle. It is also a process. Urgent debates challenging the Framework Agreement’s content, no sooner was the Accord inked, is a dismal ignorance about processes in political arbitration. Tasking the public with a vitriolic demand to know—by a recently formed organization—is rather spurned with cultivated insecurities. For sure, we know, there is no agreed content insofar. The Accord is not the Agreement.
An Accord is a priority in any pre-negotiation process. Contractual negotiations are yet to begin. Measures likely to be the Agreement’s contents are mutual to the negotiating parties alone. Similarly, public disclosure of any content of the talks prior to signing the Agreement (that is, if it happens) is also a prerogative matter. Political deals, as history reveals, are often not so public friendly. A closed or secret diplomacy, moreover, is one amongst many procedures—engaged specifically to conditions necessary for negotiations situations.
So, within the framework of the current Peace Accord, it is important to ask two questions: What do the Naga people want? Will the Naga people decide the outcome of the Agreement, or will it rest solely with the negotiating parties, i.e., Government of India and NSCN-IM?
There is no history without people. The politics of history however do not need the people. The politics of memory has become the basis of political imagination, rather than a conciliation tool for political benefits. The idea of “an honourable and peaceful solution,” which stems from this cultural-ideological manifest, is also a grim reminder of a ‘toxic past’, a history or culture constricted by trauma, and a longing to return (‘leave us alone!’)! Friedrich Nietzsche calls this as ‘ressentiment’—a “disillusionment born out of misfortune.”
How does one convert ‘politics of regret’ into an active engagement for ‘political legitimization’? The past cannot be re-lived. Yet we try to live the past, as it was. Therefore, there will be liars and, equally, geniuses, attempting to decode the past. The past is an illusion. It is unreal. “Illusion,” says Oscar Wilde, “is the first of all pleasures.” The allure for the past therein remains because it is a site of pleasure. In the machinic structure of desire, there is no difference between the political and the pleasurable. Both are rule-encoded with power and authority. Knowing the past is an act of defiance; the knowledge in knowing is an act of control. Unfortunately, the politics of enacting memory and recreating the past, in modern times, with messianic proclivities, have seen more uncivil violence and deaths, than accrued in the entire history of humanity. Whether it is the cultural or the historical, the political manufacturing and circulating of this nostalgic illusion about one’s given past produces intense pleasures, i.e., a sense of difference and also identity. Nothing is wrong or right with it. A consciousness for historicity is always inevitable, for we are trained to think in mathematical linearity. But when this ontology finds subversive utility, by linking it to an intellect of aesthetics, or an ethos or pathos of politics, really bad things do happen—through emotive entrapment in the politics of memory.
How many Nagas would believe that ‘sovereignty’ (in the absolute term) is possible today? What are the hopes tied to this memory of a political concept? Nationalism, like love, is blind. But—as subjective feelings and identity pride—nationalism and patriotism are two different issues. You are unhappy. You felt betrayed. You are angry. Your feelings were too strong. More so, your reasons were irreconcilable. Nobody, actually, forced you to become a Naga nationalist! Especially, a Naga nationalist (with a gun)! Nationalism is dangerous when you think you’re entitled. Or, the farce in patriotism is when you start to act as the only true Patriot left standing on the ship’s burning deck. Political movements are therefore also factional moments of grave emotions.
One’s identity feeling is different from connecting one’s feeling to a territory-based political-power identity. Dream but be consistent—a blind person cannot afford to realistically invest his dreams on becoming an F-16 jetfighter pilot—not until the technology of its time arrives! So, let us wait! But, most importantly, end this bloody holier-than-thou attitude and bickering! Don’t limit dreams, or hopes, but, also, don’t enforce a personal righteousness as a collective burden. Respect feelings—especially if you intend to start preaching, all over again! Stop the self-adulatory logic of accusing X Group to legitimize Z Group! Fight your own war, if necessary, without using blame games as the foundation of your struggle. Forget the paternalistic task of freedom fighting for others, or saving the future! For, the mourning for Naga National Project has not ended either. And the future always last forever.
Look at NSCN-IM today! A glorious sense of accomplishing a historic step with Government of India pervades. (No pun or sarcasm intended here!). Seriously, will they take the Naga people into confidence—before signing an Agreement, as assured? What do the Naga people want today, which is different from yesterday, or will be for tomorrow? Will the Naga people decide the outcome of the Agreement, or will the Agreement decide the outcome of the Naga people, once again, as is the politico-historical conjunction?
Allow a soft reminder on how the undivided NSCN was formed in 1980. It was solely premised on the issue that the NNC had compromised the question of Naga sovereignty. The labeling of the 1975 Nagaland Baptist Churches mediated Shillong Accord as a “complete sell-out” brought acrimonious resurgences and fratricidal feuds. The faith of betrayal has not change since then! The angry perception of history has not deviated since then! Will the Peace Accord promise happy endings, a reconstitution that all is not in vain?
Therefore, notwithstanding universal political virtues that freedom and liberty is non-negotiable or inalienable, and also trusting the fact that every generation shapes its own future—the political imagery of the Nagas, then and now, may have to test the realities of its own limits! The politics of “integration” is louder today than yesteryears’ politics of “sovereignty.” It does not matter! Sometimes it is better to just leave things after a particular point of trying—and that time is now! Or, will the Peace Accord need to wait for a bloodier opportunity? Or, wait for a new ownership from those who don’t offer discounts on Dream Sovereignty? Will it also mean, preposterous to mention, closure as a beginning, or a radical continuity?
The cornerstone of Naga political imagination is set in the violent standards of decolonization era. Such standards, despite the massive political changes occurring globally, particularly the market-driven liberalisation, continue to remain fossilized in the politics of memories. Hurt memories and wounded pride! Leaders of ‘freedom fighters’ have also played along the lines of public expectations—despite the given realities. Survival politics of a politician rather than the thinking politics of a statesmanship has been driving the bloody body of Naga Peace Politics.
To sum up: what do Nagas want from the new Accord? Is it peace, which is not something new for any society? Is it peace as the pre-condition for aspiring the good life, which is, again, a boringly repetitive idiom? Otherwise, it is the interpretation of peace that is central to the future of the current Peace Accord, rather than the Agreement-to-come that is already fearful, suspicious, secretive, and unilateral. Is Mr. Th. Muivah, or Mr. Isak Swu, shrewd enough—capable of crafting a worthy bargain to condone NSCN’s formation? Or, capable of expressing magnanimity, by looking beyond their organization? Or, capable of statesmanship, by publicly pleading forgiveness for a deal that might fall short of the in-glory of 16-Point Agreement or Shillong Accord? Or, will they enigmatically fade away with aggrieved egoism, behind smokescreens of silence, as was the case with Mr. A.Z. Phizo? Or, like any other petty politicians, will they frantically attempt to justify dogmatic acts of omissions and failures through a need to understand and appreciate changes in the language of politics?
